"Making Leaders".
ALPN founder/director, Dr. Michael
Isimbabi's
letter in
The Economist,
24 July 2003
African Leadership &
Progress Briefs
New
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and
Leadership Prize Revisited: How Dr. Ibrahim and Other Well-Off
Africans Can Best Foster Good Governance in African Countries
Addressing Africa’s
Humiliation: 'Brain Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora Networks for
African Progress
After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for Transparency
and Accountability in African Countries
Leadership & Governance Capacity
Building in African Countries: Why and How Well-Off
and Accomplished Africans, Especially "Brain Drain" Africans, Should
Proactively Take Charge of Fostering African Progress
Research/Information
Portal
New The
Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and Leadership Prize -
Commentaries & Critiques
New Illicit
Capital Flows, Tax Evasion, and African Development
Governance - Transparency - Corruption - The Resource Curse
Brain Drain, Brain Gain,
Brain Circulation, Diaspora Africans, and Capacity Building in Africa
The African Leadership &
Progress Brief
An occasional publication of the
African Leadership & Progress Network
March 2008
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and Leadership Prize
Revisited
How Dr. Ibrahim and Other Well-Off Africans Can Best Foster Good
Governance in African Countries
(By
Jump-Starting Resource-Pooling Efforts to Build High-Impact
Independent Information-based Institutions and Infrastructures that
Will Foster Accountability and the Emergence of Visionary and
Transformational Leaders)
Dr.
Mo Ibrahim’s laudable and inspiring effort has generated increased
attention to the governance challenge in Africa and the urgent
imperative to come up with innovative strategies to aggressively
address the leadership crisis, especially direly needed indigenous
initiatives developed and led by Africans themselves. As
ALPN has argued, the onus is on accomplished
Africans themselves to bring about better governance in their
countries, with or without help from the international community.
However,
the Ibrahim Foundation’s approach, which is primarily premised on
"energiz[ing] civil society," presumes that there are strong,
independent, and vigorous civil society organizations and leaders (or
so-called "change agents" or "champions") with strong supportive
networks who will be able to utilize the Governance Index information
to aggressively foster accountability in their countries.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The handful of genuinely
independent and committed civil society organizations that focus on
governance have very limited resources and are therefore weak and not
very effective against powerful and ruthless elites. And, many other
organizations that claim to be part of civil society are either not
truly independent or
are primarily motivated by partisan
political and financial considerations, and therefore lack
credibility. Furthermore, the few brave reformers and change agents
who lead good governance initiatives get very little support and
therefore easily get quashed by oppressive regimes who have national
treasuries at their disposal.
The most critical need, therefore, is to build the vigorous and
high-impact independent information-based institutions and
infrastructures that can effectively (a) galvanize citizenries at the
grassroots to make governments more accountable and (b) facilitate the
rapid emergence of visionary and strong leaders who will have
transformational impact. This is, of course, the more daunting aspect
of addressing the governance challenge, which will require substantial
resources
and take several years to accomplish.
In this brief, we discuss the limitations of the Mo Ibrahim
approach and argue that the most cost-effective use of the limited
resources available from Dr. Ibrahim and (hopefully) other well-off
Africans is to jump-start massive resource-pooling efforts to mobilize
the substantial resources needed to build the requisite high quality
institutions and infrastructures. We also present a strategic
framework for implementing such an approach, including how so-called
"Brain Drain"/Diaspora Africans, who have a special
responsibility in this regard, can play unique and transformative
roles.
I. Introduction: The Challenge – and Failure to Date – of
Fostering Good Governance in Africa
The African Leadership and Progress Network (ALPN),
like several others who genuinely want to see rapid progress in
Africa, applauds Dr. Mo Ibrahim’s
highly laudable and inspiring
efforts to help foster better governance
in African countries. The Ibrahim Foundation’s approach primarily
involves (a) publication of an annual
African Governance Index
(the inaugural edition was published in September 2007) and (b) annual
award of an
African Leadership Prize
(the inaugural Prize was awarded in October 2007
to the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano).
This approach is, of course, in line with
ALPN’s goals and strategies—when ALPN was launched in 2004, we
advocated, and have since then worked to promote, inter alia:
• Stronger and more proactive and innovative efforts by well-off
and accomplished Africans to implement independent leadership and
governance capacity building initiatives, by harnessing and
leveraging their immense but largely untapped and underutilized
resources. See, for example,
ALPN’s
Research/Information Portal
and briefs:
• Development of "ratings and rankings of African leaders based
on relevant information on leadership performance"--see ALPN's
African Leadership & Governance Rankings
webpage, which also provides links to
several sources of leadership and governance rankings and related
information.
• Development of talented emerging leaders and youth with
exceptional leadership potential into future visionary and
transformational leaders--see ALPN’s
African Leadership Capacity Development Project,
and ALPN founder/director, Dr. Michael Isimbabi’s letter in The
Economist, "Making
Leaders"
(24 July 2003).
If nothing else, the fact that a wealthy African is willing to
dedicate some of his wealth to addressing the leadership problem
should have a substantial inspirational impact on others with respect
to the basic premise of ALPN’s advocacy, i.e., that the onus is on
accomplished Africans themselves to bring about better governance in
their countries, with or without help from the international
community.
As we have argued (e.g., in the briefs cited above), regardless
of the underlying historical reasons for Africa’s current leadership
and development crises, well-off (and even not-so-well-off) Africans
have the ultimate responsibility for meeting this challenge, and must
strive to do so with a desperate sense of urgency, through effective
pooling of financial, intellectual, networking, and other resources.
Surely, those Africans who successfully fought colonialists and
dictators in the past have demonstrated that success is possible
through effective pooling of resources, however meager, and innovative
strategies.
Of course, the international community has a responsibility to
help, and some rich-country governments and institutions have done so
to a certain extent. However, given the realities of global
geopolitics and economics, it is unrealistic to expect that the
international community will deliver Africans from bad leaders. Even
the most well-intentioned rich-country governments and institutions
often face severe domestic and international political and economic
constraints with respect to what they can actually do to foster better
governance in Africa.
Furthermore, given most African leaders’ lust for power and
wealth, and their desire and ability to entrench themselves in power –
with plenty of help from some foreign corporations and governments –
it is also unrealistic to expect that initiatives such as
NEPAD’s
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
and the ‘good governance’ reform programs sponsored by the World Bank
and other aid agencies will have the transformational impact that is
necessary to bring about rapid progress. This is because such
initiatives often require the same inept and corrupt governments to
essentially reform themselves out of power. Hence these initiatives
have only been marginally effective in helping to improve governance
in just a few countries.
In general, getting wealthy governments, foundations, and
individuals to make substantial investments in leadership and
governance initiatives remains a very difficult task. This is partly
because the success of such initiatives is often uncertain and not
immediately and clearly evident, highly visible, or easily measurable
(compared to, say, stopping conflicts and wars, building education and
health infrastructures, etc.). Thus, even those foundations and
governments that genuinely want to promote good governance are
generally not inclined to provide substantial financing for (often
expensive) governance initiatives, especially as there are always
high-visibility crises that demand immediate attention and commitment
of the limited resources available.
Currently, only a tiny fraction of the aid budgets of rich
countries is allocated to promoting better governance in poorly-run
countries and, worse, very little of this is allocated to
independent initiatives. Instead, aid funds are usually given
directly to the same corrupt governments, which are then exhorted to
undertake governance reforms that, if successful, would eventually
force them out of office. Not surprisingly, this clearly unrealistic
approach has so far produced only very limited and halting progress.
Similarly, the few wealthy foundations that even consider
funding leadership initiatives allocate only relatively small amounts,
usually to small-scale projects. Notably, to his great credit,
financier and philanthropist
George Soros
has been a pioneer and innovator who has provided
substantial financing for transparency and accountability initiatives
worldwide for decades, through his
Soros Foundation
Network,
Open
Society Institutes in Africa and elsewhere,
the
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign,
the Africa
Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP),
etc. Hopefully, newer and innovative foundations such as the Gates and
Google foundations will soon also accord high priority to leadership
and governance issues and thereby rapidly boost ongoing efforts.
An argument that will hopefully gain greater acceptance is that
much more substantive investment to foster better governance in
African countries will ultimately provide high returns to wealthy
countries and foundations: With only a small fraction of the billions
of dollars in aid that will continue to be misused or stolen,
substantial investments in highly effective leadership and governance
initiatives would:
- save donors billions of dollars in future aid that would
otherwise be needed to deal with the increased poverty, civil
strife, wars, etc., that will inevitably be the consequence of
continued bad governance; and
- greatly reduce the growth of global terrorism that is likely to
result from state failure in many countries.
In general, foundations, governments, and organizations such as
the World Bank are wary of funding aggressive, high-impact
initiatives because of sensitivities to accusations by African leaders
that Western governments and institutions are interfering in their
countries’ internal affairs and attempting to remove them from power.
This obviously underscores why highly potent, grassroots-based
independent initiatives need to be developed and led by Africans
themselves. External funding will continue to have limited impact
without strong indigenous efforts by highly motivated, credible,
competent and dedicated Africans.
In any case, Africans must assume that they will
not get much help from the international community to support their
efforts and must therefore take charge on their own, even with only
meager resources. It is in this regard that wealthy African
benefactors such as Dr. Ibrahim can play crucial roles that will have
transformational impact, i.e., by jump-starting massive
resource-pooling efforts and independent governance and leadership
development initiatives.
Even if started on a small scale, an initiative
that demonstrates strong potential and effectiveness will be able to
attract more substantial support from various sources, including the
international community. Stronger backing from the international
community would, in turn, enable those working to bring about better
governance to do their work with much less fear of repression and
persecution, thereby ensuring much quicker and greater impact.
Hopefully, since the impact of aid-based and governmental
initiatives such as the APRM will remain quite limited, independent
efforts such as Dr. Ibrahim’s will further inspire other well-off
Africans to become more proactive, by generating, and investing in,
innovative ideas and implementing independent leadership development
initiatives.
Many critics have noted, however, that, given the limited
resources currently available for such initiatives, the Ibrahim
Foundation’s approach is not necessarily the most cost-effective means
of bringing about better governance in African countries, and that the
funds could be better utilized to build the infrastructures that are
direly needed to foster accountability.
In the next sections, we discuss the limitations of the Mo
Ibrahim approach and argue that the most cost-effective use of the
limited resources available from Dr. Ibrahim, and (hopefully) other
well-off Africans, is to jump-start massive resource-pooling efforts
to mobilize the substantial resources needed to build the requisite
high quality institutions and infrastructures that can:
(a) effectively galvanize citizenries at the grassroots to make
governments more transparent and accountable; and
(b) facilitate the rapid emergence of visionary and
transformational leaders.
We also present a strategic framework for implementing such an
approach, including how so-called "Brain Drain"/Diaspora Africans, who
have a special responsibility in this regard, can play unique
and transformative roles.
II. Limitations of the Ibrahim Foundation’s Approach
Dr. Ibrahim explains his rationale for establishing the
Leadership Prize, which has drawn much praise and support from Nelson
Mandela, Kofi Annan, Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and numerous others, as
follows:
"...We need to get out of this pessimism that all African leaders
are corrupt. There are some doing wonderful things and implementing
the right policies. They need to be honoured... Running an African
country is the toughest job in the world. And if you do manage to
take five million people out of poverty, or get clean water to
people or educate kids, a $5 million reward is peanuts..." [“Mo
Ibrahim Unveiled”, The East African]
----
"...There is much gossip and speculation about what Tony Blair
will do when he leaves office next year. Will he join the lecture
circuit? Will he take on a series of directorships? Will he write
his memoirs?...In Africa, the choices for heads of state are more
sobering. Most leave office with no chance of sustaining a lifestyle
equivalent to the one they enjoy while in office. The income of
former heads of government may seem a trifling issue compared to the
major problems faced by many of the continent's citizens. In fact it
is of fundamental importance in securing its future. ...A situation
in which leaders face three choices - relative poverty, term
extension, or corruption - is not conducive to good governance. And
the continent's problems will not be solved unless governance
improves radically. That's why I am today launching a foundation
that aims to change fundamentally the choices faced by African
leaders, and as a result recast the terms of the governance
debate..." [Mo
Ibrahim, “Leading Africa Forward”]
Many skeptics have, however, expressed doubt that the
Leadership Prize can motivate African leaders who are not already so
inclined to govern well. Many Africans also find it disturbing and
humiliating that their leaders have to be "bribed" to do what they are
supposed to do, i.e., govern well. Furthermore, some critics have
pointed out that the Leadership Prize approach places too much
emphasis on one person rather than the more important focus on
political elites and their cronies, public institutions,
bureaucracies, citizenries, etc., and thereby only further perpetuates
the stereotypical African 'big man' syndrome. One commentator, for
example, highlights some of the key challenges in this regard:
"...The $5m prize intended to help improve Africa's leadership
risks diverting attention from more critical institutional issues.
...Much of Africa currently holds multi-party elections. But
parliaments are poorly supported. Elected leaders can hardly be
effective representatives of their people. For example, many
parliaments debate national budgets but they cannot influence their
contents. They merely rubber-stamp proposals for the executive
branch, many of which are discussed in advance with development
partners. Similarly, judicial offices remain under-funded and lack
the administrative infrastructure to render justice in a fair and
efficient way. They need to digitise their records but can hardly
get the support to do so. The lack of administrative infrastructure
reduces transparency, breeding corruption and other malpractices.
All of this will reflect badly on leaders in power. The prize serves
a useful purpose in focusing attention on the need to improve
governance in general and leadership in particular, but more needs
to be done to help Africa build the institutional infrastructure
needed to deepen democracy."
[Calestous
Juma, “Trophy leaders are not enough”]
[For links to several other critiques and commentaries on the
Ibrahim Foundation’s approach, visit ALPN’s Web Portal Page:
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance
Index and Leadership Prize]
The rationale for the Prize – i.e., that the only choice facing
a leader besides term extension and corruption is relative poverty –
is tenuous at best. In today’s global environment, Africans who
distinguish themselves through exemplary leadership can count on
international accolades and numerous avenues for ensuring their
financial security and international recognition. Organizations such
as the Clinton Global Initiative, the Gates Foundation, the Soros
Foundations, and others would only be too glad to provide such leaders
with the global platform, financial security, and resources to enable
them continue to do work that will have a substantive impact on
African development. Nelson Mandela is, of course, the most obvious
example in this regard. But even if his case is an unusual or unique
one, other recent examples include Ngozi Okonji-Iweala (the former
Nigerian Minister of Finance who is now back at the World Bank
following a stint at Washington, DC’s prestigious think-tank, the
Brookings Institution), John Kithongo (Kenya’s former permanent
secretary in charge of governance and ethics, now a senior associate
member of St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK), and 2004 Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Wangari Maathai.
Obviously, the increased attention and discourse on governance
in Africa generated by the Prize and Governance Index are very
positive developments, for which Dr. Ibrahim should be highly lauded.
However, as he himself has acknowledged, these initiatives by
themselves are not sufficient to adequately address the governance
challenge.
Looking ahead, say, over the next 10-15 years, the Prize is
likely to go to leaders who governed or are governing well and were
already inclined to be good leaders anyway without the enticement of
the award. Thus, it is still not clear how the Prize will motivate any
of the current leaders of Africa’s most populous and/or resource-rich
nations, virtually all of which are badly governed, to change behavior
or relinquish power voluntarily, since they know that they are
unlikely to ever win the Prize.
Furthermore, for these leaders, whose primary motivation is
power and wealth, the Prize is also ‘mere peanuts’ compared to (a) the
large amounts they know they can steal without severe consequences and
(b) the thrills and benefits of absolute power. The Prize is therefore
not a sufficient incentive to entice them to govern better or
relinquish power. Thus, because the countries over which such leaders
preside constitute the vast majority of the African population, the
Prize by itself is unlikely to do much in terms of making a difference
in the lives of most ordinary Africans, who will therefore remain
perpetually mired under bad governance unless much more effective
strategies to make their governments more accountable are employed.
This is, of course, the daunting challenge that can be
successfully addressed only if substantial resources are invested
consistently over several years in high-impact initiatives that will
foster transparency and accountability. The question, therefore, is
how best to utilize the limited resources available, and whether the
Leadership Prize and the Governance Index are the most cost-effective
approaches in this regard.
The broader governance challenge is, of course, how to solve
the seemingly intractable problems of
institutionalized corruption, inefficient
bureaucracies, dysfunctional institutions, entrenched powerful
interests, tribal and ethnic divisions and conflicts, etc., that even
a highly committed and uncorrupt leader, who may otherwise be
deserving of the Prize, could be powerless to do much about.
Furthermore, any attempt to solve the governance problem will be
unsuccessful if it does not adequately address the fact that some
powerful foreign firms (and a few governments) (a) help to prop up bad
leaders and (b) facilitate corruption, e.g., through the illicit
siphoning of funds out of Africa through transfer pricing, shady and
illegal transactions, tax evasion, etc., and provision of safe havens
for corrupt officials and their stolen assets in Western banks,
offshore financial centers, etc. [The G8, the World Bank, former and
current UK prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and others
have acknowledged this as a serious problem. For details, see ALPN’s
Web Portal Page,
Illicit Capital Flows, Tax
Evasion, and African Development,
which provides links to several documents
on this issue by organizations such as
Global Financial Integrity,
Global Witness,
Publish What You Pay,
Tax
Justice Network, Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and others.] As is
well-known, stopping even a fraction of these illicit outflows would
leave substantial amounts of funds in most African countries – even
much more than they currently get in aid – which, if properly
utilized, would have a much greater impact on poverty than aid
handouts.
The Ibrahim Governance Index is intended to be a tool to be
used in addressing the daunting governance challenge. According to the
Ibrahim Foundation, the Index is a comprehensive ranking of good
governance developed "in recognition of the need for a more
comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring
governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa." The Foundation expects that
"its publication will lead to an improvement in the way in which the
citizens of sub-Saharan African countries are governed, while
stimulating debate across societies about the criteria by which good
governance should best be assessed."
According to Dr. Ibrahim, the governance information reflected
in the Index is intended to "really energize civil society...We will
give information to civil society. That is accountability, which is
very important" (Speech
by Dr. Ibrahim at the UN’s 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government).
He also stresses the importance of, and need for, independent
initiatives by Africans themselves:
"This is an African initiative, occupying a unique space which
NGOs, foreign donors and the investment community, for obvious
reasons, are not able to fill. I am committing my resources to
it because I am convinced that, used in this way, they can have a
massive and disproportionate impact on the health and prosperity of
the continent." (Emphasis added) [Mo
Ibrahim, “Leading Africa Forward”]
---
"...So, we set out really to do the things that you believe
that neither the World Bank, nor the United Nations, nor the
European Union, nor the other Communities can do, which is to speak
frankly. Because we are a member of civil society, we are really
able to speak frankly, to measure, and publish, and rank, and tell
countries what we are doing and also tell leaders what they are
doing, because we are going to map each leader’s period of
leadership on their performance. Then, we need to give these
facts to civil society in a very easily digestible form to know
exactly what we are doing. Then, you take issues with guys, if you
want to." (Emphasis added) [Speech
by Dr. Ibrahim at the UN’s 7th Global Forum on Reinventing
Government]
---
"The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is shining a light on
governance in Africa and, in so doing, improving its quality.
Progress is being made: for the period assessed by the first Ibrahim
index (2000-05), overall governance performance in sub-Saharan
Africa improved. To be sure, not all countries improved. According
to the Ibrahim index, governance deteriorated in just under a
quarter of the region’s countries.
The index will be updated yearly, providing a scorecard of
national progress assessed against objective criteria, and a
framework for African civil society to engage its leaders in a
debate about how we are governed. This is an African initiative,
occupying a space which donors, investors and governments are not
able to fill. It is about Africans taking ownership, developing
their own forms of accountability, and delivering change. It is
about Africans setting benchmarks that the world can emulate."
(Emphasis added) [ Mo
Ibrahim, "Criteria for a continent", The World in 2008 (The
Economist)]
However, this
approach presumes that there are strong, independent, and vigorous
institutions and civil society organizations (or some will
spontaneously evolve) that will use the governance information to
energize citizenries at the grassroots, intensify public demand, and
exert strong pressure for better performance, not just on one person,
but on political leaders and elites (including those not in power),
other public officials, public institutions, business and civic
elites, the private sector, etc. Even in advanced democracies with
well-functioning governments, the existence of such independent
institutions and civil society (the media, think tanks, academics,
research, policy, education, information, and advocacy groups, etc.)
remains crucial to ensuring transparency and accountability, given the
human tendency of those in power anywhere to become power-drunk,
hubristic, secretive, and corrupt.
Unfortunately, most African countries currently do not have
such vigorous and highly influential civil society organizations that
focus on governance issues, and the handful that are genuinely
committed, highly motivated, and truly independent have very limited
resources. They are therefore weak and not very effective, since they
are usually dealing with powerful, corrupt, and often ruthless leaders
and their cronies who control their nations’ resources and have no
qualms about using these resources to harass, suppress, or even kill
those who demand accountability, believing, usually correctly, that
they can get away with poor performance and criminal behavior.
Furthermore, many other organizations that proclaim themselves to be
part of civil society are not truly independent, or are motivated
primarily by partisan political and financial considerations, and
therefore lack credibility.
Clearly, the most critical need is therefore the establishment
of high quality institutions and infrastructures that can be
effectively "energized" to actually bring about substantive change by
sharply focusing on high-impact strategies. Otherwise, as useful as it
is to measure and rank governance, the Ibrahim Index will have little
impact on most African leaders, who will simply ignore or dismiss it,
as they have other older ratings of leadership performance, such as:
Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World,
Global
Integrity Index, the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index,
the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Selection Criteria,
Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index,
the World Bank's Governance Indicators,
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of
Democracy,
the Open Budget Initiative's Open Budget
Index/Budget Transparency Country Rankings, etc.
Usually, following publications of these ratings, there’s some media
coverage, along with lamentation and hand-wringing about poor
governance in Africa, and then everyone goes on with business as
usual.
Nevertheless, the Ibrahim Index has the potential to have much
greater impact than previous rankings because it (a) puts a specific
focus on Africa, (b) is sponsored by an African who evidently is
prepared to use his considerable resources to bring about change, (c)
is supported by respected figures such as Nelson Mandela and Kofi
Annan, and (d) has an advisory council made up of "eminent African
academics." Hence, it cannot simply be dismissed as yet another set of
ratings produced by biased non-Africans, though it does rely largely
on data produced by non-African organizations and was developed at
Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Despite its shortcomings (discussed below), publication of the
Index reportedly has generated much media coverage and discourse in
African countries and internationally, including discussions at the
Brookings Institution ("How
to Rank Good Governance: The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in
African Leadership"), the World Bank ("Africa's
Crises: Strengthening Leadership & Governance"), and other
institutions. However, it remains to be seen what practical impact it
will have, i.e., whether (a) it will indeed generate enough debate to
put African leaders under much greater scrutiny and pressure, and (b)
the increased attention will galvanize Africans and others to be more
proactive about demanding greater accountability from their leaders.
To ensure the desired substantive impact beyond press coverage
and passive debate with little consequential action, Dr. Ibrahim and
his distinguished supporters will need to use their substantial
stature and clout to deliberately and forcefully bring immense
pressure to bear on African leaders and force them to pay attention.
Even then, the failure to date of the APRM’s peer review approach
(after more than five years) has already shown that not much will
happen unless civil society and citizenries are effectively galvanized
to demand better governance.
Furthermore, the Index’s potential impact is in danger of being
undercut by its shortcomings. Because its ratings are derived from
some of the same data used to compute previous ratings (such as those
cited above), the Index, not surprisingly, provides little additional
information -- beyond the overall assessments already evident from
these other indexes -- that can have any significant impact on African
leaders.
As the developers of the Index themselves acknowledge, and
critics have noted, the inaugural "2007" index, which is actually
based largely on 2005 data, needs to be refined to provide more
accurate indicators of leadership performance, as there is much to
criticize about the methodology used and the conclusions derived
therefrom. [See, for example,
the transcript of the panel discussion at the Brookings Institution
and
Marta Foresti, "Assessing governance: No easy task",
for critiques.]
One glaring example is Gabon, a country that has been ruled by
an oppressive dictatorship for over 40 years, ranked at No. 6 in
overall governance, largely on the strength of its No. 1 ranking in
the "Safety and Security" category, which ironically is a result of
severe repression. Similarly, Equatorial Guinea, clearly a very badly
governed country, earns a relatively respectable 32nd
ranking overall, largely because of a very high ‘Safety and Security’
ranking.
Another important aspect of the Index’s ratings that needs to
be comprehensively addressed is the distinction between measures of
the state of affairs in a country, which may be the
result of the actions of previous leaders and therefore is not
necessarily attributable to the leadership in power at the time data
were collected, and change in the country’s state
of affairs based on actual performance of the
leadership. For example, a leader may be doing a great job of cleaning
up the mess left by her predecessor, which would imply a very high
"change" (performance) score despite a low "state" score. [The World
Bank’s Aart Kraay also makes a related distinction between the
"development" and "governance" aspects of the Index’s measures during
the
panel discussion at the Brookings event.]
Incidentally, the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
(BTI) makes such a distinction. Its
Status Index "shows the development achieved by…states on their
way toward democracy and a market economy. States with functioning
democratic and market-based structures receive the highest scores."
The Management Index, however, "reveals the extent to which
governments and political actors have been consistent and determined
in their pursuit of a market-based democracy. Those states showing
progress in the last five years and in which transformation has
resulted from astute management receive the highest scores."
Interestingly, with the exception of Gabon (for the reason
noted above) and smaller countries that are not included in the BTI,
the Ibrahim Index’s rankings are quite similar to the BTI’s 2006
Status Index (which are also based on 2005 data), e.g., the top six
countries common to both indexes, and their ranking orders, are
exactly the same. (The BTI does not include all sub-Saharan African
countries, while the Ibrahim Index does.) For obvious reasons, as
explained above, the Management Index is not as highly correlated with
the Ibrahim and BTI Status Indexes.
To be sure, despite its limitations, the overall impact of the
Ibrahim approach to date has been positive, as several commentators
have noted—it clearly has generated increased attention and advanced
the discourse on governance in African countries. However, in order to
ensure the transformational impact that is necessary, the limited
resources available should be applied toward establishment of strong,
independent, and high-quality information infrastructures and civil
society organizations that can be effectively energized to foster
better governance. We present an approach for achieving this goal in
the next section.
III. ALPN’s Approach: Resource-Pooling for
High-Impact, Independent Information-based Institutions and
Infrastructures
Better governance and leaderships will evolve only when those
in power know that they will pay severe penalties for poor
performance, i.e., if there is strong public demand and pressure to
make them - and those foreign firms and governments that aid and abet
them - more accountable. But then such public pressure will evolve
only if populaces are well-informed about their countries’ resources,
how well they are utilized, how to demand and ensure transparency and
accountability, etc., and then take the necessary actions to hold
their leaders’ feet to the fire.
Unfortunately, as noted above, most African countries do not
have the strong and independent civil society organizations that can
effectively utilize the information provided by the Ibrahim Index and
others to bring about better leadership performance. Given the
substantial resources required, the most crucial role that wealthy
Africans such as Dr. Ibrahim can play is to galvanize massive and
effective resource-pooling efforts among well-off Africans, in order
to provide a solid resource base for implementing critical
initiatives, such as:
1. Establishment of high-impact, independent, and robust
information-based institutions and infrastructures that will energize
citizenries, especially at the grassroots, to take charge of fostering
change and force their leaders to be accountable. These would include,
for example:
- Reputable, nonpartisan, and vigorous media organizations
(radio, TV, print, Internet, etc.). One proposal, for example, calls
for the establishment of an "independent, indigenous, multimedia,
multilingual, pan-continental broadcasting network, owned and
managed by Africans,.... broadcasting on television, radio, and the
Internet," that would "push secretive governments toward greater
transparency, foster economic and political ties between distant
parts of the continent, and report honestly on events and trends
affecting Africans…" [Philip
Fiske de Gouveia, "Africa Needs an Al-Jazeera"]
- Independent and objective research, policy, education,
information, and advocacy organizations and experts (think-tanks,
public education groups, academics, etc.)
- Private oversight and community watchdog groups; etc.
[For a detailed discussion, see ALPN’s brief:
After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for
Transparency and Accountability in African Countries (2005)]
2. Development of young people with exceptional potential, and
provision of support for genuine emerging leaders, in order to
facilitate the rapid emergence of visionary and transformational
leaders. [See ALPN’s
African Leadership Capacity Development Project
for a detailed framework. See also
The Global Integrity Alliance.]
Of course, resource-pooling need not be
restricted to only well-off Africans. Even Africans of modest means
can also pool resources and launch small-scale initiatives that can
have significant impact--the resources do not have to be financial:
resource-pooling could be through intellectual collaborations, network
development, information dissemination, advisory services, etc.
[For details, see ALPN’s briefs:
"After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for Transparency
and Accountability in African Countries"
and
"Addressing
Africa’s Humiliation: 'Brain Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora
Networks for African Progress".]
Through effective pooling of financial, intellectual, networking,
and other resources, as well as innovative use of the Internet and
other information and communications technologies, even individuals
and small groups can help to foster greater transparency and
accountability by focusing sharply on specific issues such as:
- Monitoring, research, analysis, information dissemination, and
public education – on leadership performance, policies, public
management of resources (revenues, budgets, procurements and
contracts, etc.), etc. -- to raise awareness on citizens’ rights and
entitlements, change mindsets, build sustained public support,
reduce barriers such as tribal and ethnic divisions which inept and
oppressive regimes exploit to entrench themselves in power, etc.
- Freedom of expression, press freedom, media independence, etc.,
to enable greater access to information and transparency (e.g.,
through enactment of Freedom of Information Acts, etc.).
- Collaboration with like-minded international organizations to
effectively address the "other" or "supply-side" (foreign) side of
corruption and bad leadership in Africa--foreign firms and
governments that (a) prop up bad leaders, (b) aid and abet
corruption and illicit siphoning of funds out of Africa, and (c)
provide safe havens for corrupt officials and their stolen assets in
offshore financial centers, tax havens, etc.
- Development and advocacy of alternative policies and
strategies, to foster competition in ideas and better economic
management and leadership
- Provision of strong and proactive support for emerging
visionary and transformational leaders to enable them to effectively
fight entrenched corrupt interests and bring about meaningful change
in their countries
- Training/mentoring/development of young people with exceptional
leadership potential, to foster the rapid evolution of visionary,
committed, uncorrupt, knowledgeable, competent, and transformational
leaders.
As ALPN has advocated, one particular high-potential group of
Africans, so-called "Brain Drain"/Diaspora Africans (BDAs) resident in
Western countries, is particularly well-suited and well-placed to
implement many of these independent, nongovernmental initiatives in
several innovative ways. [For links to information and websites on
work by BDAs worldwide, visit ALPN’s Research/Information Portal:
Brain Drain, Brain Gain, Brain Circulation,
Diaspora Africans, and Capacity Building in Africa.]
Many BDAs already utilize personal resources to implement
several useful projects at community and national levels in their
native countries and their countries of residence. However, the
substantial collective resources of large numbers of BDAs –
intellectual, financial, networking, etc. – most of whom obviously
care deeply about leadership in Africa (but usually feel helpless to
do anything about the problem), are yet to be effectively harnessed
toward implementing high-impact governance initiatives.
Thus, a critical imperative is the development of networks and
teams of BDAs located in different countries and continents –
professionals whose areas of expertise span political/public affairs,
policy, law, management, business, finance, economics, media and
communications, information dissemination, journalism, science,
information/communications and other technologies, etc. – that will
work on the issues listed above in their respective areas of expertise
and interest (research, analysis, public education,
knowledge/information dissemination, networking, partnerships,
capacity building, training, mentoring, counseling, technical
assistance, advocacy, etc.). To the extent possible, such teams would,
of course, collaborate with or support colleagues and compatriots in
African countries.
Based on the (obvious) reasoning that BDAs have a special
responsibility to pool their resources toward fostering better
governance in Africa, ALPN is working to facilitate the development of
such networks [see ALPN’s
Leadership & Governance Capacity Building in
African Countries...]. As Dr. Ibrahim
has noted, "we Africans in the diaspora, who have had the opportunity
to be in the developed world, to learn skills and to build personal
wealth, have a duty to Africa. We need to support the continent
through various efforts such as investing in it. We have a debt to pay
to our people and our families..." [“Mo
Ibrahim Unveiled”, The East African]
For various reasons, many BDAs are unable to permanently
relocate back to their native countries. However, given the ease of
collaboration, discourse, networking, and information collection and
dissemination through the Internet and other
information/communications technologies, they can still work on the
transparency and accountability issues outlined above even without
such relocation. In some cases, occasional short visits to their
native countries may be necessary and, in other cases, e.g., where
governments are highly repressive, BDAs could even be more effective
working on initiatives from outside their native countries. [For a
detailed discussion, see ALPN’s brief:
Addressing Africa’s Humiliation: 'Brain
Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora Networks for African Progress.]
Examples of projects on which teams or networks of BDAs, in
association with counterparts in their native countries where
possible, can work without having to travel anywhere, or even
physically meet, are:
1. Analysis of budgets (revenues, expenditures, government
priorities, etc.), contracts, etc. and wide (global) dissemination
of findings and recommendations, by teams of BDAs with expertise in
public policy, economics, finance, quantitative analysis, law, etc.
[For details and case studies on the importance and proven impact of
budget analysis work, visit:
International Budget Project;
Africa
Budget Project]
2. Monitoring, analysis, and dissemination of information on
illicit financial flows out of Africa, tax havens, etc., by
banking/finance/tax experts, economists, lawyers, etc. [For ongoing
work on this issue, visit:
Global Financial Integrity,
Global
Witness,
Tax Justice Network]
3. Work on Freedom of Information Acts, other legal frameworks
and issues relating to access to information, political and economic
freedom, human rights, etc., by lawyers, media and
communications/information professionals, etc., including
collaboration with African and international organizations.
4. Gathering, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of
information, and development of national and international networks,
on various issues, to provide support as needed by civil society
organizations, media organizations, parliaments, etc. in their
native countries. BDAs have easier and cheaper access to
sophisticated Internet/information and communications services and
technologies, and can therefore provide immense assistance to
counterparts in African countries whose resources are limited.
5. Collaborative work with international coalitions such as
Global Financial
Integrity,
Global Witness,
Publish What You Pay,
Tax Justice Network, etc. that work
on transparency and accountability issues.
6. Training and mentoring young and emerging leaders in their
native countries who have the potential to become transformational
change agents in civil society, by helping them with research,
information, advice, support, information and communication
technologies, linkages to supportive global networks, etc.
Even with very limited resources, thousands of highly
motivated, committed, and competent Africans in the Diaspora and the
continent are already trying to do something about poor leadership
performance in their countries, often at their own expense and at
great personal risk. Many of these brilliant and proven professionals,
who already have clearly demonstrated strong interest, motivation, and
ability to do innovative and high quality work, would jump at the
chance to work on independent leadership and governance initiatives
full-time in or outside their countries, as necessary, if they were
assured of funding for at least two to three years from the Ibrahim
Foundation and other visionary and innovative foundations.
IV. Conclusion
Dr. Mo Ibrahim’s laudable and inspiring effort has generated
increased attention to the governance challenge in Africa and the
urgent imperative to come up with innovative strategies to
aggressively address the leadership crisis, especially direly needed
indigenous initiatives developed and led by Africans themselves.
He and (hopefully) other well-off Africans can have
transformational and sustained impact in this area by galvanizing
massive resource-pooling efforts to build the solid resource base that
is direly needed for building the information-based institutions and
infrastructures that will energize citizenries to foster transparency
and accountability and the evolution of visionary and transformational
leaders. The framework described in this brief offers a cost-effective
approach for achieving this goal.
Given the crucial importance of such efforts to African
progress, accomplished Africans such as Dr. Ibrahim who fund
successful initiatives in this area will be counted among the most
patriotic and transformational leaders who ever lived.
© 2004-2008. The
African Leadership & Progress Network & Capital Researchers
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