"Making
Leaders".
ALPN founder/director,
Dr. Michael Isimbabi's
letter in
The Economist,
24 July 2003
African Leadership &
Progress Briefs
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and
Leadership Prize Revisited: How Dr. Ibrahim and Other Well-Off
Africans Can Best Foster Good Governance in African Countries
Addressing Africa’s
Humiliation: 'Brain Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora Networks for
African Progress
After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for Transparency
and Accountability in African Countries
Leadership & Governance Capacity Building in
African Countries: Why and How Well-Off and Accomplished
Africans, Especially "Brain Drain" Africans, Should Proactively Take
Charge of Fostering African Progress
Research/Information Portal
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and Leadership Prize -
Commentaries & Critiques
Illicit Capital Flows, Tax Evasion, and African Development
Governance - Transparency - Corruption - The Resource Curse
Brain Drain, Brain Gain,
Brain Circulation, Diaspora Africans, and Capacity Building in Africa
The African Leadership &
Progress Brief
An occasional publication of the
African Leadership & Progress Network
March 2008
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance Index and Leadership Prize
Revisited
How Dr. Ibrahim and Other Well-Off Africans Can Best Foster Good
Governance in African Countries
(By
Jump-Starting Resource-Pooling Efforts to Build High-Impact
Independent Information-based Institutions and Infrastructures that
Will Foster Accountability and the Emergence of Visionary and
Transformational Leaders)
Dr.
Mo Ibrahim’s laudable and inspiring effort has generated increased
attention to the governance challenge in Africa and the urgent
imperative to come up with innovative strategies to aggressively
address the leadership crisis, especially direly needed indigenous
initiatives developed and led by Africans themselves. As
ALPN has argued, the onus is on accomplished
Africans themselves to bring about better governance in their
countries, with or without help from the international community.
However,
the Ibrahim Foundation’s approach, which is primarily premised on
"energiz[ing] civil society," presumes that there are strong,
independent, and vigorous civil society organizations and leaders (or
so-called "change agents" or "champions") with strong supportive
networks who will be able to utilize the Governance Index information
to aggressively foster accountability in their countries.
Unfortunately, this is not the case. The handful of genuinely
independent and committed civil society organizations that focus on
governance have very limited resources and are therefore weak and not
very effective against powerful and ruthless elites. And, many other
organizations that claim to be part of civil society are either not
truly independent or
are primarily motivated by partisan
political and financial considerations, and therefore lack
credibility. Furthermore, the few brave reformers and change agents
who lead good governance initiatives get very little support and
therefore easily get quashed by oppressive regimes who have national
treasuries at their disposal.
The most critical need, therefore, is to build
the vigorous and high-impact independent information-based
institutions and infrastructures that can effectively (a) galvanize
citizenries at the grassroots to make governments more accountable and
(b) facilitate the rapid emergence of visionary and strong leaders who
will have transformational impact. This is, of course, the more
daunting aspect of addressing the governance challenge, which will
require substantial resources
and take several years to accomplish.
In this
brief, we discuss the limitations of the Mo Ibrahim approach and argue
that the most cost-effective use of the limited resources available
from Dr. Ibrahim and (hopefully) other well-off Africans is to
jump-start massive resource-pooling efforts to mobilize the
substantial resources needed to build the requisite high quality
institutions and infrastructures. We also present a strategic
framework for implementing such an approach, including how so-called
"Brain Drain"/Diaspora Africans, who have a special
responsibility in this regard, can play unique and transformative
roles.
For links to the websites of organizations and
initiatives that are actively helping to foster transparency,
accountability, and better governance in African countries -- through
capacity building, research, analysis/evaluation, information
dissemination, public education, and advocacy -- visit our
Governance - Transparency - Corruption -
The Resource Curse
webpage.
I. Introduction: The Challenge – and Failure to Date – of
Fostering Good Governance in Africa
The African Leadership and Progress Network (ALPN),
like several others who genuinely want to see rapid progress in
Africa, applauds Dr. Mo Ibrahim’s
highly laudable and inspiring
efforts to help foster better governance
in African countries. The Ibrahim Foundation’s approach primarily
involves (a) publication of an annual
African Governance Index
(the inaugural edition was published in September 2007) and (b) annual
award of an
African Leadership Prize
(the inaugural Prize was awarded in October 2007
to the former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano).
This approach is, of course, in line with
ALPN’s goals and strategies—when ALPN was launched in 2004, we
advocated, and have since then worked to promote, inter alia:
• Stronger and more proactive and innovative efforts by well-off
and accomplished Africans to implement independent leadership and
governance capacity building initiatives, by harnessing and
leveraging their immense but largely untapped and underutilized
resources. See, for example,
ALPN’s
Research/Information Portal
and briefs:
• Development of "ratings and rankings of African leaders based
on relevant information on leadership performance"--see ALPN's
African Leadership & Governance Rankings
webpage, which also provides links to
several sources of leadership and governance rankings and related
information.
• Development of talented emerging leaders and youth with
exceptional leadership potential into future visionary and
transformational leaders--see ALPN’s
African Leadership Capacity Development Project,
and ALPN founder/director, Dr. Michael Isimbabi’s letter in The
Economist, "Making
Leaders"
(24 July 2003).
If nothing else, the fact that a wealthy African
is willing to dedicate some of his wealth to addressing the leadership
problem should have a substantial inspirational impact on others with
respect to the basic premise of ALPN’s advocacy, i.e., that the onus
is on accomplished Africans themselves to bring about better
governance in their countries, with or without help from the
international community.
As we have argued (e.g., in the briefs cited
above), regardless of the underlying historical reasons for Africa’s
current leadership and development crises, well-off (and even
not-so-well-off) Africans have the ultimate responsibility for meeting
this challenge, and must strive to do so with a desperate sense of
urgency, through effective pooling of financial, intellectual,
networking, and other resources. Surely, those Africans who
successfully fought colonialists and dictators in the past have
demonstrated that success is possible through effective pooling of
resources, however meager, and innovative strategies.
Of course, the international community has a
responsibility to help, and some rich-country governments and
institutions have done so to a certain extent. However, given the
realities of global geopolitics and economics, it is unrealistic to
expect that the international community will deliver Africans from bad
leaders. Even the most well-intentioned rich-country governments and
institutions often face severe domestic and international political
and economic constraints with respect to what they can actually do to
foster better governance in Africa.
Furthermore, given most African leaders’ lust
for power and wealth, and their desire and ability to entrench
themselves in power – with plenty of help from some foreign
corporations and governments – it is also unrealistic to expect that
initiatives such as
NEPAD’s
African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
and the ‘good governance’ reform programs sponsored by the World Bank
and other aid agencies will have the transformational impact that is
necessary to bring about rapid progress. This is because such
initiatives often require the same inept and corrupt governments to
essentially reform themselves out of power. Hence these initiatives
have only been marginally effective in helping to improve governance
in just a few countries.
In general, getting wealthy governments,
foundations, and individuals to make substantial investments in
leadership and governance initiatives remains a very difficult task.
This is partly because the success of such initiatives is often
uncertain and not immediately and clearly evident, highly visible, or
easily measurable (compared to, say, stopping conflicts and wars,
building education and health infrastructures, etc.). Thus, even those
foundations and governments that genuinely want to promote good
governance are generally not inclined to provide substantial financing
for (often expensive) governance initiatives, especially as there are
always high-visibility crises that demand immediate attention and
commitment of the limited resources available.
Currently, only a tiny fraction of the aid
budgets of rich countries is allocated to promoting better governance
in poorly-run countries and, worse, very little of this is allocated
to
independent initiatives. Instead, aid funds are usually given
directly to the same corrupt governments, which are then exhorted to
undertake governance reforms that, if successful, would eventually
force them out of office. Not surprisingly, this clearly unrealistic
approach has so far produced only very limited and halting progress.
Similarly, the few wealthy foundations that even
consider funding leadership initiatives allocate only relatively small
amounts, usually to small-scale projects. Notably, to his great
credit, financier and philanthropist
George Soros
has been a pioneer and innovator who has provided
substantial financing for transparency and accountability initiatives
worldwide for decades, through his
Soros Foundation
Network,
Open
Society Institutes in Africa and elsewhere,
the
Publish What You Pay (PWYP) Campaign,
the Africa
Governance, Monitoring and Advocacy Project (AfriMAP),
etc. Hopefully, newer and innovative foundations such as the Gates and
Google foundations will soon also accord high priority to leadership
and governance issues and thereby rapidly boost ongoing efforts.
An argument that will hopefully gain greater
acceptance is that much more substantive investment to foster better
governance in African countries will ultimately provide high returns
to wealthy countries and foundations: With only a small fraction of
the billions of dollars in aid that will continue to be misused or
stolen, substantial investments in highly effective leadership and
governance initiatives would:
- save donors billions of dollars in future aid that would
otherwise be needed to deal with the increased poverty, civil
strife, wars, etc., that will inevitably be the consequence of
continued bad governance; and
- greatly reduce the growth of global terrorism that is likely to
result from state failure in many countries.
In general, foundations, governments, and
organizations such as the World Bank are wary of funding
aggressive, high-impact initiatives because of sensitivities to
accusations by African leaders that Western governments and
institutions are interfering in their countries’ internal affairs and
attempting to remove them from power. This obviously underscores why
highly potent, grassroots-based independent initiatives need to be
developed and led by Africans themselves. External funding will
continue to have limited impact without strong indigenous efforts by
highly motivated, credible, competent and dedicated Africans.
In any case, Africans must assume
that they will not get much help from the international community to
support their efforts and must therefore take charge on their own,
even with only meager resources. It is in this regard that wealthy
African benefactors such as Dr. Ibrahim can play crucial roles that
will have transformational impact, i.e., by jump-starting massive
resource-pooling efforts and independent governance and leadership
development initiatives.
Even if started on a small scale,
an initiative that demonstrates strong potential and effectiveness
will be able to attract more substantial support from various sources,
including the international community. Stronger backing from the
international community would, in turn, enable those working to bring
about better governance to do their work with much less fear of
repression and persecution, thereby ensuring much quicker and greater
impact.
Hopefully, since the impact of aid-based and
governmental initiatives such as the APRM will remain quite limited,
independent efforts such as Dr. Ibrahim’s will further inspire other
well-off Africans to become more proactive, by generating, and
investing in, innovative ideas and implementing independent leadership
development initiatives.
Many critics have noted, however, that, given
the limited resources currently available for such initiatives, the
Ibrahim Foundation’s approach is not necessarily the most
cost-effective means of bringing about better governance in African
countries, and that the funds could be better utilized to build the
infrastructures that are direly needed to foster accountability.
In the next sections, we discuss the limitations
of the Mo Ibrahim approach and argue that the most cost-effective use
of the limited resources available from Dr. Ibrahim, and (hopefully)
other well-off Africans, is to jump-start massive resource-pooling
efforts to mobilize the substantial resources needed to build the
requisite high quality institutions and infrastructures that can:
(a) effectively galvanize citizenries at the grassroots to make
governments more transparent and accountable; and
(b) facilitate the rapid emergence of visionary and
transformational leaders.
We also present a strategic framework for implementing such an
approach, including how so-called "Brain Drain"/Diaspora Africans, who
have a special responsibility in this regard, can play unique
and transformative roles.
II. Limitations of the Ibrahim Foundation’s Approach
Dr. Ibrahim explains his rationale for
establishing the Leadership Prize, which has drawn much praise and
support from Nelson Mandela, Kofi Annan, Tony Blair, Bill Clinton, and
numerous others, as follows:
"...We need to get out of this pessimism that all African leaders
are corrupt. There are some doing wonderful things and implementing
the right policies. They need to be honoured... Running an African
country is the toughest job in the world. And if you do manage to
take five million people out of poverty, or get clean water to
people or educate kids, a $5 million reward is peanuts..." [“Mo
Ibrahim Unveiled”, The East African]
----
"...There is much gossip and speculation about what Tony Blair
will do when he leaves office next year. Will he join the lecture
circuit? Will he take on a series of directorships? Will he write
his memoirs?...In Africa, the choices for heads of state are more
sobering. Most leave office with no chance of sustaining a lifestyle
equivalent to the one they enjoy while in office. The income of
former heads of government may seem a trifling issue compared to the
major problems faced by many of the continent's citizens. In fact it
is of fundamental importance in securing its future. ...A situation
in which leaders face three choices - relative poverty, term
extension, or corruption - is not conducive to good governance. And
the continent's problems will not be solved unless governance
improves radically. That's why I am today launching a foundation
that aims to change fundamentally the choices faced by African
leaders, and as a result recast the terms of the governance
debate..." [Mo
Ibrahim, “Leading Africa Forward”]
Many skeptics have, however, expressed doubt
that the Leadership Prize can motivate African leaders who are not
already so inclined to govern well. Many Africans also find it
disturbing and humiliating that their leaders have to be "bribed" to
do what they are supposed to do, i.e., govern well. Furthermore, some
critics have pointed out that the Leadership Prize approach places too
much emphasis on one person rather than the more important focus on
political elites and their cronies, public institutions,
bureaucracies, citizenries, etc., and thereby only further perpetuates
the stereotypical African 'big man' syndrome. One commentator, for
example, highlights some of the key challenges in this regard:
"...The $5m prize intended to help improve Africa's leadership
risks diverting attention from more critical institutional issues.
...Much of Africa currently holds multi-party elections. But
parliaments are poorly supported. Elected leaders can hardly be
effective representatives of their people. For example, many
parliaments debate national budgets but they cannot influence their
contents. They merely rubber-stamp proposals for the executive
branch, many of which are discussed in advance with development
partners. Similarly, judicial offices remain under-funded and lack
the administrative infrastructure to render justice in a fair and
efficient way. They need to digitise their records but can hardly
get the support to do so. The lack of administrative infrastructure
reduces transparency, breeding corruption and other malpractices.
All of this will reflect badly on leaders in power. The prize serves
a useful purpose in focusing attention on the need to improve
governance in general and leadership in particular, but more needs
to be done to help Africa build the institutional infrastructure
needed to deepen democracy."
[Calestous
Juma, “Trophy leaders are not enough”]
[For links to several other critiques and commentaries on the
Ibrahim Foundation’s approach, visit ALPN’s Web Portal Page:
The Mo Ibrahim African Governance
Index and Leadership Prize]
The rationale for the Prize – i.e., that the
only choice facing a leader besides term extension and corruption is
relative poverty – is tenuous at best. In today’s global environment,
Africans who distinguish themselves through exemplary leadership can
count on international accolades and numerous avenues for ensuring
their financial security and international recognition. Organizations
such as the Clinton Global Initiative, the Gates Foundation, the Soros
Foundations, and others would only be too glad to provide such leaders
with the global platform, financial security, and resources to enable
them continue to do work that will have a substantive impact on
African development. Nelson Mandela is, of course, the most obvious
example in this regard. But even if his case is an unusual or unique
one, other recent examples include Ngozi Okonji-Iweala (the former
Nigerian Minister of Finance who is now back at the World Bank
following a stint at Washington, DC’s prestigious think-tank, the
Brookings Institution), John Kithongo (Kenya’s former permanent
secretary in charge of governance and ethics, now a senior associate
member of St Antony’s College, Oxford, UK), and 2004 Nobel Peace Prize
winner, Wangari Maathai.
Obviously, the increased attention and discourse
on governance in Africa generated by the Prize and Governance Index
are very positive developments, for which Dr. Ibrahim should be highly
lauded. However, as he himself has acknowledged, these initiatives by
themselves are not sufficient to adequately address the governance
challenge.
Looking ahead, say, over the next 10-15 years,
the Prize is likely to go to leaders who governed or are governing
well and were already inclined to be good leaders anyway without the
enticement of the award. Thus, it is still not clear how the Prize
will motivate any of the current leaders of Africa’s most populous
and/or resource-rich nations, virtually all of which are badly
governed, to change behavior or relinquish power voluntarily, since
they know that they are unlikely to ever win the Prize.
Furthermore, for these leaders, whose primary
motivation is power and wealth, the Prize is also ‘mere peanuts’
compared to (a) the large amounts they know they can steal without
severe consequences and (b) the thrills and benefits of absolute
power. The Prize is therefore not a sufficient incentive to entice
them to govern better or relinquish power. Thus, because the countries
over which such leaders preside constitute the vast majority of the
African population, the Prize by itself is unlikely to do much in
terms of making a difference in the lives of most ordinary Africans,
who will therefore remain perpetually mired under bad governance
unless much more effective strategies to make their governments more
accountable are employed.
This is, of course, the daunting challenge that
can be successfully addressed only if substantial resources are
invested consistently over several years in high-impact initiatives
that will foster transparency and accountability. The question,
therefore, is how best to utilize the limited resources available, and
whether the Leadership Prize and the Governance Index are the most
cost-effective approaches in this regard.
The broader governance challenge is, of course,
how to solve the seemingly intractable problems of
institutionalized corruption, inefficient
bureaucracies, dysfunctional institutions, entrenched powerful
interests, tribal and ethnic divisions and conflicts, etc., that even
a highly committed and uncorrupt leader, who may otherwise be
deserving of the Prize, could be powerless to do much about.
Furthermore, any attempt to solve the governance problem will be
unsuccessful if it does not adequately address the fact that some
powerful foreign firms (and a few governments) (a) help to prop up bad
leaders and (b) facilitate corruption, e.g., through the illicit
siphoning of funds out of Africa through transfer pricing, shady and
illegal transactions, tax evasion, etc., and provision of safe havens
for corrupt officials and their stolen assets in Western banks,
offshore financial centers, etc. [The G8, the World Bank, former and
current UK prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and others
have acknowledged this as a serious problem. For details, see ALPN’s
Web Portal Page,
Illicit Capital Flows, Tax
Evasion, and African Development,
which provides links to several documents
on this issue by organizations such as
Global Financial Integrity,
Global Witness,
Publish What You Pay,
Tax
Justice Network, Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), and others.] As is
well-known, stopping even a fraction of these illicit outflows would
leave substantial amounts of funds in most African countries – even
much more than they currently get in aid – which, if properly
utilized, would have a much greater impact on poverty than aid
handouts.
The Ibrahim Governance Index is intended to be a
tool to be used in addressing the daunting governance challenge.
According to the Ibrahim Foundation, the Index is a comprehensive
ranking of good governance developed "in recognition of the need for a
more comprehensive, objective and quantifiable method of measuring
governance quality in sub-Saharan Africa." The Foundation expects that
"its publication will lead to an improvement in the way in which the
citizens of sub-Saharan African countries are governed, while
stimulating debate across societies about the criteria by which good
governance should best be assessed."
According to Dr. Ibrahim, the governance
information reflected in the Index is intended to "really energize
civil society...We will give information to civil society. That is
accountability, which is very important" (Speech
by Dr. Ibrahim at the UN’s 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government).
He also stresses the importance of, and need for, independent
initiatives by Africans themselves:
"This is an African initiative, occupying a unique space which
NGOs, foreign donors and the investment community, for obvious
reasons, are not able to fill. I am committing my resources to
it because I am convinced that, used in this way, they can have a
massive and disproportionate impact on the health and prosperity of
the continent." (Emphasis added) [Mo
Ibrahim, “Leading Africa Forward”]
---
"...So, we set out really to do the things that you believe
that neither the World Bank, nor the United Nations, nor the
European Union, nor the other Communities can do, which is to speak
frankly. Because we are a member of civil society, we are really
able to speak frankly, to measure, and publish, and rank, and tell
countries what we are doing and also tell leaders what they are
doing, because we are going to map each leader’s period of
leadership on their performance. Then, we need to give these
facts to civil society in a very easily digestible form to know
exactly what we are doing. Then, you take issues with guys, if you
want to." (Emphasis added) [Speech
by Dr. Ibrahim at the UN’s 7th Global Forum on Reinventing
Government]
---
"The Ibrahim Index of African Governance is shining a light on
governance in Africa and, in so doing, improving its quality.
Progress is being made: for the period assessed by the first Ibrahim
index (2000-05), overall governance performance in sub-Saharan
Africa improved. To be sure, not all countries improved. According
to the Ibrahim index, governance deteriorated in just under a
quarter of the region’s countries.
The index will be updated yearly, providing a scorecard of
national progress assessed against objective criteria, and a
framework for African civil society to engage its leaders in a
debate about how we are governed. This is an African initiative,
occupying a space which donors, investors and governments are not
able to fill. It is about Africans taking ownership, developing
their own forms of accountability, and delivering change. It is
about Africans setting benchmarks that the world can emulate."
(Emphasis added) [ Mo
Ibrahim, "Criteria for a continent", The World in 2008 (The
Economist)]
However, this approach presumes that there are strong, independent,
and vigorous institutions and civil society organizations (or some
will spontaneously evolve) that will use the governance information to
energize citizenries at the grassroots, intensify public demand, and
exert strong pressure for better performance, not just on one person,
but on political leaders and elites (including those not in power),
other public officials, public institutions, business and civic
elites, the private sector, etc. Even in advanced democracies with
well-functioning governments, the existence of such independent
institutions and civil society (the media, think tanks, academics,
research, policy, education, information, and advocacy groups, etc.)
remains crucial to ensuring transparency and accountability, given the
human tendency of those in power anywhere to become power-drunk,
hubristic, secretive, and corrupt.
Unfortunately, most African countries currently
do not have such vigorous and highly influential civil society
organizations that focus on governance issues, and the handful that
are genuinely committed, highly motivated, and truly independent have
very limited resources. They are therefore weak and not very
effective, since they are usually dealing with powerful, corrupt, and
often ruthless leaders and their cronies who control their nations’
resources and have no qualms about using these resources to harass,
suppress, or even kill those who demand accountability, believing,
usually correctly, that they can get away with poor performance and
criminal behavior. Furthermore, many other organizations that proclaim
themselves to be part of civil society are not truly independent, or
are motivated primarily by partisan political and financial
considerations, and therefore lack credibility.
Clearly, the most critical need is therefore the
establishment of high quality institutions and infrastructures that
can be effectively "energized" to actually bring about substantive
change by sharply focusing on high-impact strategies. Otherwise, as
useful as it is to measure and rank governance, the Ibrahim Index will
have little impact on most African leaders, who will simply ignore or
dismiss it, as they have other older ratings of leadership
performance, such as:
Freedom House’s
Freedom in the World,
Global
Integrity Index, the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index,
the Millennium Challenge Corporation's Selection Criteria,
Transparency International's Corruption
Perceptions Index,
the World Bank's Governance Indicators,
The Economist Intelligence Unit’s Index of
Democracy,
the Open Budget Initiative's Open Budget
Index/Budget Transparency Country Rankings, etc.
Usually, following publications of these ratings, there’s some media
coverage, along with lamentation and hand-wringing about poor
governance in Africa, and then everyone goes on with business as
usual.
Nevertheless, the Ibrahim Index has the
potential to have much greater impact than previous rankings because
it (a) puts a specific focus on Africa, (b) is sponsored by an African
who evidently is prepared to use his considerable resources to bring
about change, (c) is supported by respected figures such as Nelson
Mandela and Kofi Annan, and (d) has an advisory council made up of
"eminent African academics." Hence, it cannot simply be dismissed as
yet another set of ratings produced by biased non-Africans, though it
does rely largely on data produced by non-African organizations and
was developed at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government.
Despite its shortcomings (discussed below),
publication of the Index reportedly has generated much media coverage
and discourse in African countries and internationally, including
discussions at the Brookings Institution ("How
to Rank Good Governance: The Mo Ibrahim Prize for Achievement in
African Leadership"), the World Bank ("Africa's
Crises: Strengthening Leadership & Governance"), and other
institutions. However, it remains to be seen what practical impact it
will have, i.e., whether (a) it will indeed generate enough debate to
put African leaders under much greater scrutiny and pressure, and (b)
the increased attention will galvanize Africans and others to be more
proactive about demanding greater accountability from their leaders.
To ensure the desired substantive impact beyond
press coverage and passive debate with little consequential action,
Dr. Ibrahim and his distinguished supporters will need to use their
substantial stature and clout to deliberately and forcefully bring
immense pressure to bear on African leaders and force them to pay
attention. Even then, the failure to date of the APRM’s peer review
approach (after more than five years) has already shown that not much
will happen unless civil society and citizenries are effectively
galvanized to demand better governance.
Furthermore, the Index’s potential impact is in
danger of being undercut by its shortcomings. Because its ratings are
derived from some of the same data used to compute previous ratings
(such as those cited above), the Index, not surprisingly, provides
little additional information -- beyond the overall assessments
already evident from these other indexes -- that can have any
significant impact on African leaders.
As the developers of the Index themselves
acknowledge, and critics have noted, the inaugural "2007" index, which
is actually based largely on 2005 data, needs to be refined to provide
more accurate indicators of leadership performance, as there is much
to criticize about the methodology used and the conclusions derived
therefrom. [See, for example,
the transcript of the panel discussion at the Brookings Institution
and
Marta Foresti, "Assessing governance: No easy task",
for critiques.]
One glaring example is Gabon, a country that has
been ruled by an oppressive dictatorship for over 40 years, ranked at
No. 6 in overall governance, largely on the strength of its No. 1
ranking in the "Safety and Security" category, which ironically is a
result of severe repression. Similarly, Equatorial Guinea, clearly a
very badly governed country, earns a relatively respectable 32nd
ranking overall, largely because of a very high ‘Safety and Security’
ranking.
Another important aspect of the Index’s ratings
that needs to be comprehensively addressed is the distinction between
measures of the state of affairs in a country, which may
be the result of the actions of previous leaders and therefore is not
necessarily attributable to the leadership in power at the time data
were collected, and change in the country’s state
of affairs based on actual performance of the
leadership. For example, a leader may be doing a great job of cleaning
up the mess left by her predecessor, which would imply a very high
"change" (performance) score despite a low "state" score. [The World
Bank’s Aart Kraay also makes a related distinction between the
"development" and "governance" aspects of the Index’s measures during
the
panel discussion at the Brookings event.]
Incidentally, the
Bertelsmann Transformation Index
(BTI) makes such a distinction. Its
Status Index "shows the development achieved by…states on their
way toward democracy and a market economy. States with functioning
democratic and market-based structures receive the highest scores."
The Management Index, however, "reveals the extent to which
governments and political actors have been consistent and determined
in their pursuit of a market-based democracy. Those states showing
progress in the last five years and in which transformation has
resulted from astute management receive the highest scores."
Interestingly, with the exception of Gabon (for
the reason noted above) and smaller countries that are not included in
the BTI, the Ibrahim Index’s rankings are quite similar to the BTI’s
2006 Status Index (which are also based on 2005 data), e.g., the top
six countries common to both indexes, and their ranking orders, are
exactly the same. (The BTI does not include all sub-Saharan African
countries, while the Ibrahim Index does.) For obvious reasons, as
explained above, the Management Index is not as highly correlated with
the Ibrahim and BTI Status Indexes.
To be sure, despite its limitations, the overall
impact of the Ibrahim approach to date has been positive, as several
commentators have noted—it clearly has generated increased attention
and advanced the discourse on governance in African countries.
However, in order to ensure the transformational impact that is
necessary, the limited resources available should be applied toward
establishment of strong, independent, and high-quality information
infrastructures and civil society organizations that can be
effectively energized to foster better governance. We present an
approach for achieving this goal in the next section.
III. ALPN’s Approach: Resource-Pooling for
High-Impact, Independent Information-based Institutions and
Infrastructures
Better governance and leaderships will evolve
only when those in power know that they will pay severe penalties for
poor performance, i.e., if there is strong public demand and pressure
to make them - and those foreign firms and governments that aid and
abet them - more accountable. But then such public pressure will
evolve only if populaces are well-informed about their countries’
resources, how well they are utilized, how to demand and ensure
transparency and accountability, etc., and then take the necessary
actions to hold their leaders’ feet to the fire.
Unfortunately, as noted above, most African
countries do not have the strong and independent civil society
organizations that can effectively utilize the information provided by
the Ibrahim Index and others to bring about better leadership
performance. Given the substantial resources required, the most
crucial role that wealthy Africans such as Dr. Ibrahim can play is to
galvanize massive and effective resource-pooling efforts among
well-off Africans, in order to provide a solid resource base for
implementing critical initiatives, such as:
1. Establishment of high-impact, independent, and robust
information-based institutions and infrastructures that will energize
citizenries, especially at the grassroots, to take charge of fostering
change and force their leaders to be accountable. These would include,
for example:
- Reputable, nonpartisan, and vigorous media organizations
(radio, TV, print, Internet, etc.). One proposal, for example, calls
for the establishment of an "independent, indigenous, multimedia,
multilingual, pan-continental broadcasting network, owned and
managed by Africans,.... broadcasting on television, radio, and the
Internet," that would "push secretive governments toward greater
transparency, foster economic and political ties between distant
parts of the continent, and report honestly on events and trends
affecting Africans…" [Philip
Fiske de Gouveia, "Africa Needs an Al-Jazeera"]
- Independent and objective research, policy, education,
information, and advocacy organizations and experts (think-tanks,
public education groups, academics, etc.)
- Private oversight and community watchdog groups; etc.
[For a detailed discussion, see ALPN’s brief:
After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for
Transparency and Accountability in African Countries (2005)]
2. Development of young people with exceptional potential, and
provision of support for genuine emerging leaders, in order to
facilitate the rapid emergence of visionary and transformational
leaders. [See ALPN’s
African Leadership Capacity Development Project
for a detailed framework. See also
The Global Integrity Alliance.]
Of course, resource-pooling
need not be restricted to only well-off Africans. Even Africans of
modest means can also pool resources and launch small-scale
initiatives that can have significant impact--the resources do not
have to be financial: resource-pooling could be through intellectual
collaborations, network development, information dissemination,
advisory services, etc.
[For details, see ALPN’s briefs:
"After the 2005 G8 and UN Summits: Independent,
High-Impact Information Infrastructures and Networks for Transparency
and Accountability in African Countries"
and
"Addressing
Africa’s Humiliation: 'Brain Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora
Networks for African Progress".]
Through effective pooling of financial, intellectual, networking,
and other resources, as well as innovative use of the Internet and
other information and communications technologies, even individuals
and small groups can help to foster greater transparency and
accountability by focusing sharply on specific issues such as:
- Monitoring, research, analysis, information dissemination, and
public education – on leadership performance, policies, public
management of resources (revenues, budgets, procurements and
contracts, etc.), etc. -- to raise awareness on citizens’ rights and
entitlements, change mindsets, build sustained public support,
reduce barriers such as tribal and ethnic divisions which inept and
oppressive regimes exploit to entrench themselves in power, etc.
- Freedom of expression, press freedom, media independence, etc.,
to enable greater access to information and transparency (e.g.,
through enactment of Freedom of Information Acts, etc.).
- Collaboration with like-minded international organizations to
effectively address the "other" or "supply-side" (foreign) side of
corruption and bad leadership in Africa--foreign firms and
governments that (a) prop up bad leaders, (b) aid and abet
corruption and illicit siphoning of funds out of Africa, and (c)
provide safe havens for corrupt officials and their stolen assets in
offshore financial centers, tax havens, etc.
- Development and advocacy of alternative policies and
strategies, to foster competition in ideas and better economic
management and leadership
- Provision of strong and proactive support for emerging
visionary and transformational leaders to enable them to effectively
fight entrenched corrupt interests and bring about meaningful change
in their countries
- Training/mentoring/development of young people with exceptional
leadership potential, to foster the rapid evolution of visionary,
committed, uncorrupt, knowledgeable, competent, and transformational
leaders.
As ALPN has advocated, one particular
high-potential group of Africans, so-called "Brain Drain"/Diaspora
Africans (BDAs) resident in Western countries, is particularly
well-suited and well-placed to implement many of these independent,
nongovernmental initiatives in several innovative ways. [For links to
information and websites on work by BDAs worldwide, visit ALPN’s
Research/Information Portal:
Brain Drain, Brain Gain, Brain Circulation,
Diaspora Africans, and Capacity Building in Africa.]
Many BDAs already utilize personal resources to
implement several useful projects at community and national levels in
their native countries and their countries of residence. However, the
substantial collective resources of large numbers of BDAs –
intellectual, financial, networking, etc. – most of whom obviously
care deeply about leadership in Africa (but usually feel helpless to
do anything about the problem), are yet to be effectively harnessed
toward implementing high-impact governance initiatives.
Thus, a critical imperative is the development
of networks and teams of BDAs located in different countries and
continents – professionals whose areas of expertise span
political/public affairs, policy, law, management, business, finance,
economics, media and communications, information dissemination,
journalism, science, information/communications and other
technologies, etc. – that will work on the issues listed above in
their respective areas of expertise and interest (research, analysis,
public education, knowledge/information dissemination, networking,
partnerships, capacity building, training, mentoring, counseling,
technical assistance, advocacy, etc.). To the extent possible, such
teams would, of course, collaborate with or support colleagues and
compatriots in African countries.
Based on the (obvious) reasoning that BDAs have
a special responsibility to pool their resources toward
fostering better governance in Africa, ALPN is working to facilitate
the development of such networks [see ALPN’s
Leadership & Governance Capacity Building in
African Countries...]. As Dr. Ibrahim
has noted, "we Africans in the diaspora, who have had the opportunity
to be in the developed world, to learn skills and to build personal
wealth, have a duty to Africa. We need to support the continent
through various efforts such as investing in it. We have a debt to pay
to our people and our families..." [“Mo
Ibrahim Unveiled”, The East African]
For various reasons, many BDAs are unable to
permanently relocate back to their native countries. However, given
the ease of collaboration, discourse, networking, and information
collection and dissemination through the Internet and other
information/communications technologies, they can still work on the
transparency and accountability issues outlined above even without
such relocation. In some cases, occasional short visits to their
native countries may be necessary and, in other cases, e.g., where
governments are highly repressive, BDAs could even be more effective
working on initiatives from outside their native countries. [For a
detailed discussion, see ALPN’s brief:
Addressing Africa’s Humiliation: 'Brain
Gain'/'Brain Circulation' Diaspora Networks for African Progress.]
Examples of projects on which teams or networks
of BDAs, in association with counterparts in their native countries
where possible, can work without having to travel anywhere, or even
physically meet, are:
1. Analysis of budgets (revenues, expenditures, government
priorities, etc.), contracts, etc. and wide (global) dissemination
of findings and recommendations, by teams of BDAs with expertise in
public policy, economics, finance, quantitative analysis, law, etc.
[For details and case studies on the importance and proven impact of
budget analysis work, visit:
International Budget Project;
Africa
Budget Project]
2. Monitoring, analysis, and dissemination of information on
illicit financial flows out of Africa, tax havens, etc., by
banking/finance/tax experts, economists, lawyers, etc. [For ongoing
work on this issue, visit:
Global Financial Integrity,
Global
Witness,
Tax Justice Network]
3. Work on Freedom of Information Acts, other legal frameworks
and issues relating to access to information, political and economic
freedom, human rights, etc., by lawyers, media and
communications/information professionals, etc., including
collaboration with African and international organizations.
4. Gathering, analysis, synthesis, and dissemination of
information, and development of national and international networks,
on various issues, to provide support as needed by civil society
organizations, media organizations, parliaments, etc. in their
native countries. BDAs have easier and cheaper access to
sophisticated Internet/information and communications services and
technologies, and can therefore provide immense assistance to
counterparts in African countries whose resources are limited.
5. Collaborative work with international coalitions such as
Global Financial
Integrity,
Global Witness,
Publish What You Pay,
Tax Justice Network, etc. that work
on transparency and accountability issues.
6. Training and mentoring young and emerging leaders in their
native countries who have the potential to become transformational
change agents in civil society, by helping them with research,
information, advice, support, information and communication
technologies, linkages to supportive global networks, etc.
Even with very limited resources, thousands of
highly motivated, committed, and competent Africans in the Diaspora
and the continent are already trying to do something about poor
leadership performance in their countries, often at their own expense
and at great personal risk. Many of these brilliant and proven
professionals, who already have clearly demonstrated strong interest,
motivation, and ability to do innovative and high quality work, would
jump at the chance to work on independent leadership and governance
initiatives full-time in or outside their countries, as necessary, if
they were assured of funding for at least two to three years from the
Ibrahim Foundation and other visionary and innovative foundations.
IV. Conclusion
Dr. Mo Ibrahim’s laudable and inspiring effort
has generated increased attention to the governance challenge in
Africa and the urgent imperative to come up with innovative strategies
to aggressively address the leadership crisis, especially direly
needed indigenous initiatives developed and led by Africans
themselves.
He and (hopefully) other well-off Africans can
have transformational and sustained impact in this area by galvanizing
massive resource-pooling efforts to build the solid resource base that
is direly needed for building the information-based institutions and
infrastructures that will energize citizenries to foster transparency
and accountability and the evolution of visionary and transformational
leaders. The framework described in this brief offers a cost-effective
approach for achieving this goal.
Given the crucial importance of such efforts to
African progress, accomplished Africans such as Dr. Ibrahim who fund
successful initiatives in this area will be counted among the most
patriotic and transformational leaders who ever lived.
© 2004-2008. The African
Leadership & Progress Network & Capital Researchers
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